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Supreme Court Review
value to the owner and the special adaptability of the property for
his specific purposes and the injurious affection to adjoining land
retained by the owner as well as other considerations. The conten-
tious issue of the 10% allowance for compulsory taking which had
been affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Woods Manufacturing case,
rejected by the President of the Exchequer Court in the Supertest
case and apparently abandoned by the Supreme Court in the Drew
case, does not seem to be altogether dead, but only moribund. In the
Drew case Locke J. stated that in order to justify the additional 10%
there must be special circumstances. Almost exactly one year later
the Ontario Court of Appeal in Re Eix and the County of Waterloo
([1963] 1 O.R. 389) awarded the 10% for compulsory taking in a
case the report of which does not lend itself to the inference of
"special circumstances" as the land in question was a narrow strip
of farmland required for the widening of a highway.
"Market value" alone might not always do justice to the owner,
either because there is no market in the sense that a buyer with
whom the owner would at least negotiate could readily be found or
else because the land in question has for the owner some peculiar
value. However, if the Supreme Court found a way of rejecting the
"10% formula", it might well also find occasion to substitute the
"market value" test for that of "value to the owner" and the lament
of Thorson P. in the Supertest case with regard to the difficulties of
ascertaining the several items and of then applying them as a yard-
stick might once more have far reaching effect. The most sensible
solution, it is submitted, would be for the legislature to take the
initiative and consider seriously legislation similar to the English
Acquistion of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act of 1919 which
without unduly restricting the owner's rights has contributed greatly
to settle this nettlesome area of the law. E. von K.
(ii) MECHANICS LIENS
Clarkson Co. Ltd. et al. v. Ace Lumber Ltd. et al., [1963] S.C.R. 110.
The Supreme Court of Canada has recently decided in the case
of Clarkson Company Limited et al. v. Ace Lumber Limited et al.'
that the rental of construction equipment to a subcontractor for use
on a specific building project does not entitle the supplier of that
equipment to a lien within s. 5 of the Ontario Mechanics' Lien Act.2
It was held that such a contribution to the building project did not
amount to the performance of a service or the furnishing of materials
to be used in the construction within the meaning of that section.
1 [1963J S.C.R. 110.
2 R.S.O. 1960, c. 233.
1964]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
The subcontractor, to whom the equipment had been rented,
became bankrupt. Consequently, liens were claimed by two com-
panies for the rental price of the equipment, which had been used in
the erection of form work for concrete floors and columns in a build-
ing constructed on land owned by one of the appellants. The other
appellant, the Clarkson Company, was joined as a defendant in its
capacity as trustee in bankruptcy or the subcontractor. The equip-
ment renters never parted with title to the equipment during these
transactions and did not supply any personnel to assist with its instal-
lation or use.
On these facts, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a unanimous
judgment delivered by Ritchie J., held that the plaintiffs had not
furnished "any materials to be used in the making, constructing,
erecting... of any erection, building.. ."3 within the meaning of the
Act. To this extent, the decision accords with all the opinions in the
Court of Appeal for Ontario.4 Both Courts agreed that unless the
equipment was actually incorporated into the building or consumed
in the construction process, it could not be described as "used" within
the meaning of the section.5 The possibility of partial consumption
or depreciation of the equipment was not raised but it is submitted
that the language of their Lordships indicates that nothing short of
complete consumption or incorporation would persuade them to sup-
port such a -lien claim. The Courts' conclusion seems well supported
by the authorities cited6 and is, indeed, further supported by the
American cases7 listed in the footnote to a quotation from Corpus
Juris which Ritchie J. used later in the judgment for another purpose.
The Supreme Court then went on to hold, reversing the majority
decision of the Court of Appeal, that the facts did not justify a lien
for the performance of a service. Roach J.A. had reasoned below that,
since the word "service" had been added to the Act some twenty years
after it was first passed, it must be treated as having a different
meaning from the word "work" which had been included in the Act
from its inception. While this reasoning appeals to logic, it might
be noted that what scant reports exist of the legislative debates at
the time of that amendment do not pause to comment or to attach
any significance to the addition of the word "service". If the reports
show anything, it is that the concern of the legislature at that time
was focused on the plight of the average labourer.8 It would, therefore,
seem unjustified to allow language adopted in such an atmosphere
and unaltered since to redound to the advantage of claimants of the
3 Ibid., s. 5(1).
4 [1962] O.R. 748.
5Per Ritchie J.: [1963] S.C.R. 110, 112; per Roach J.A.: [1962] O.R. 748,
751. 6 Macauley & Bruce on Canadian Mechanics' Liens, 1951, p. 43 and Re
Northlands Grading & Earth Moving Co., [1960] O.R. 455.
7 Gilbert Hunt Co. v. Parry (1910), 59 Wash. 646, 649 and Webb v. Freng(1923), 181 Wis. 39, 45.
s Toronto Mail and Empire, March 24 and April 7, 1896.
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nature of the present corrporate plaintiffs. Nevertheless, this is the
result of the reasoning of the majority in the Court of Appeal. Roach
J.A. proceeded to adopt "a meaning consistent with the spirit of the
Act",9 as he saw it. He noted that older methods for supporting
concrete until it hardened had been held to give rise to liens and
concluded that that right ought not to be lost simply because technical
improvements had made such equipment reusable. The Interpretation
Act, s. 4, which states that "the law shall be considered as always
speaking,"' 0 was cited in support of this contention. Ritchie J., in the
Supreme Court, endeavoured to answer this proposition by pointing
out that the Act had been revised as recently as 1960 and that there-
fore this was not an occasion for adapting the language of an old
statute to fit modern conditions." With respect, it must be pointed out
that the revision upon which his Lordship relied was not in any
sense a real review of the Act but only a simple consolidation of the
former Act with its recent amendments, none of which had anything
to do with s. 5. Indeed the section has only been modified in insignifi-
cant details since it was first enacted in 1896. Therefore, it is respect-
fully submitted that this particular aspect of the Supreme Court's
criticism of the lower decision is not justified. The Court was being
asked to interpret old language in the light of new circumstances.
However, it was not that aspect against which the Supreme Court
particularly addressed its remarks.
The Court of Appeal had approached the problem of interpretation
from a liberal and expansive point of view with the expressed object
of implementing what was conceived by the majority to be the spirit
of the Act. Despite reference to the words of the Act as having a
sufficiently plain meaning,12 it is submitted that, in effect, the majority
was employing the attitude sometimes described as the mischief
rule, first enunciated by Lord Coke in Heydon's Case.1 3 However, in
ascertaining the mischief and the remedy supplied by the legislature,
it is not open to a court to add to the legislation. The possibility of
such activity was advocated by Denning L.J. in Magor and St. Mellons
Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation14 but his suggestion
that a court could fill the gaps in legislation was emphatically re-
jected by Lord Simonds in the House of Lords in the following words:
This proposition - cannot be supported. It appears to me to be a naked
usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of inter-
pretation. 15
The language of Ritchie J. in the case at bar, while less colourful,
was equally emphatic. He noted that since the legislature "made no
9 [1962] O.R. 748, 753.
10 R.S.O. 1960, c. 191.
11 Supra, footnote 1, 114.12 Supra, footnote 4, 753.
13 (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b.
14 [1950] 2 All E.R. 1226, 1236.
15 [1952] A.C. 189, 191.
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express provision for the inclusion of the renters of such equipment
amongst those persons entitled to a mechancis' lien, it does not now
lie with the Courts to create such a lien by adapting the statutory
language that was used so as to accomplish that purpose."'16
Clearly the liberal approach to interpretation did not find favour
in the Supreme Court. Rather the Court preferred to adopt the dis-
senting opinion of Kelly J.A. who held:
[The Act] constitutes an abrogation of the common law to the extent
that it creates, in the specified circumstances, a charge upon the owner's
lands which would not exist but for the Act - accordingly, while the
statute may merit a liberal interpretation with respect to the rights It
confers upon those to whom it applies, it must be given a strict inter-
pretation in determining whether any lien-claimant is a person to whom
a lien is given by it.17
The Court thus relied upon the traditional presumption against
depriving the appellants of their common law rights as grounds for
rejecting the more expansive attitude of the majority below.
Secondly, the Supreme Court preferred a much more literal inter-
pretation of the words in issue. Their Lordships concluded that even
if the mere supplying of equipment constitutes a service, that does
not override the necessity of showing that the supplier "performs"
that service. In the words of Ritchie J.:
the words 'furnishes' and 'performs' as they occur in s. 5 of the Act
must be given separate meanings and that the latter word must be
taken as connoting some active participation in the performance of
the service on the part of the lien claimant.18
The third aspect of the judgment is the attempt, and it is res-
pectfully submitted, the unsuccessful attempt to derive support for
the conclusion from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Nova
Scotia in the case of Cromwell Bros. Ltd. v. Maritime Minerals Ltd.
et al.19 In that case the Court adopted the language of Corpus Juris 20
that:
unless expressly so provided by statute, no lien can be acquired for
the value or use of tools, machinery or appliances furnished or loaned
for the purpose of facilitating the work where they remain the property
of the contractor and are not consumed in their use but remain capable
of use in some other construction or improvement work.
Taken as it stands this statement leaves little hope for the res-
pondents. However, an examination of the American cases on which
the statement is based may lead to the conclusion that the statement
ought not to have been applied in the present case. The case of Cald-
well v. SteinfeZd is illustrative of all those cited in Corpus Juris. It con-
tains a statement generally similar to the one quoted above,21 but
16 Supra, footnote 1, 116.
17 Supra, footnote 4, 758.18 Suvra, footnote 1. 115.
19 (1940) 15 M.P.R. 39.20 Vol. 40 at p. 86.
21 (1923) 294 F. 270, 217.
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the statute there being construed contains no reference to the perform-
ance of a service as the basis for a lien.22 The same is true of all the
other cases cited.23 In each case the statute confers a lien only for the
furnishing of materials or the performance of labour. Services are
never mentioned. As was suggested earlier, the quotation supports
the Court's conclusion that there can be no lien for the furnishing
of materials in the case at bar, but it is respectfully submitted that
there is no justification for its use in support of a finding that there
can be no lien for the performance of a service.
The use of American material in Canadian courts is, of course,
by no means new, although in some cases it may be given rather
summary consideration. Indeed, the statement from Corpus Juris
was passed over very quickly by Roach J.A. in the Court of Appeal.
He did, however, remark in passing24 on the necessity of considering
the provisions of the relevant American statutes, an admonition
which seems, unfortunately, to have been overlooked in the Supreme
Court.
That American decisions can play a useful role in Canadian
jurisprudence is not open to contest. The recent British Columbia
case of Sloan v. Union Oil is illustrative of that utility. In it Wilson
J. noted that not only had American courts anticipated English
developments in the field in question but they had already applied
the new reasoning in fact situations similar to the case before him.
He then quoted five pages of American material which, it is submitted,
amply justified his conclusion that:
I find these authorities, foreign of course, but not foreign to the common
law, most convincing.2 5
In that case the learned judge was importing comments based on
common law. In transplanting decisions based on statutes extra
precautions must be taken to insure that the statutes are comparable.
The judgment of Ritchie J. does not contain any indication that these
precautions were taken in the present case. It is, therefore, submitted
with respect that the third part of his reasoning is untenable.
What remains to separate the conclusion of the Supreme Court
from that of the majority in the Court of Appeal is a fairly bald anti-
thesis between their approaches to statutory interpretation. On the
one hand the Court of Appeal, despite some reference to the plain
meaning of words, has sought a broad interpretation consistent with
the alleged spirit of the Act, whereas the Supreme Court has enlisted
a presumption in favour of the preservation of the appellants' common
law rights unless specifically abridged by the Act and has taken a
more literal approach to the words under consideration.
22 Para. 3653 of Civ. Code of Arizona, Revised Statutes of Arizona, 1913.
23 Cf. Gilbert Hunt Co. v. Parry (1910), 59 Wash. 646, 649 interpreting
s. 1129 of Rem. & Bal. Code and Webb v. Freng (1923), 181 Wis. 39, 45 Inter-
preting s. 3327(a) Statutes of Wisconsin.24 Supra, footnote 4, 755-6.
25 (1955) 16 W.W.R. 225, 245.
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Each of these attitudes has both merits and defects. In support
of the so-called mischief rule apparently employed in the Court of
Appeal Maxwell has written:
to arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact
conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole Act.
To which he added the warning that:
At the same time the language of the statute must not be strained to
make it apply to a case which does not legitimately, on its terms, apply
by invoking consideration of the supposed intention of the legislature.26
In short, the mischief rule does not confer a licence to legislate. It
may well be argued that modern statutes, couched in general language
and aimed at achieving socially desirable results ought not to be
subjected to more rigid rules of interpretation which may only serve
to thwart those results. Perhaps, indeed, judges ought to attempt
to discover and implement the so-called spirit of such Acts. It is sub-
mitted that such a suggestion was not lost on the Supreme Court.
The quotation from Kelly J.A. cited earlier and adopted by Ritchie
J. does contain a liberal attitude toward the rights conferred by
the Act. The Supreme Court only employed a strict interpretation in
deciding on whom those rights were bestowed.
It should also be remembered that not only the application but
the approach itself is open to some criticism. Much of its attraction
is lost when it is recalled that the courts have consistently refused, at
least since 1903,27 to look to the best sources for discovering legislative
intentions, namely the reports of debates and royal commissions.
The judges are thus forced to rely on their own social consciousness
and it may well be that their particular sympathies will be at variance
with those of the legislature. This seems to have been the result in
the Court of Appeal.
A survey of reported comments in the legislature, admittedly
few in number because of the long reluctance of the Ontario Legisla-
ture to record its deliberations, indicates that the principle object
of concern was the plight of ordinary labourers. It is true that, at the
time the Mechanics' Lien Act was first passed in 1873, it was only
because of pressure by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Cameron,
that a clause, setting a minimum of fifty dollars on the amount of
a lien claimable under the Act, was removed.28 Considering the low
wage rates of that time, such a clause would have effectively excluded
most labourers from any benefit under the Act. But, as pointed out,
that clause was eliminated and by 1896, when the Act was substan-
tially amended, the legislation was clearly focused upon the working
man. The Lieutenant-Governor's speech on prorogation commented
on the new Act as follows:
2 6 Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th ed., Pp. 18-19.
27 Gosselin v. 1. (1903), 33 S.C.R. 255.
2 s Reported in the Toronto Mail: Feb. 19, 1873, p. 4.
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The circumstances under which the working-men and mechanics of this
Province, as elsewhere, provide for the maintenance and protection of
their families are at best somewhat precarious. The means which you
have adopted to secure to them their proper earnings will serve to im-
prove their social condition and to promote the happiness and comfort
of all who are dependent upon them for subsistence and support.29
It is submitted that the legislature's intentions have not changed sig-
nificantly since 1896 and, notwithstanding the fact that contractors
and subcontractors are also protected by the Act, there is nothing in
either the language or spirit of the Act to justify the extension of
that protection to mere renters of equipment.
The alternative approach to interpretation adopted by the Su-
preme Court is no less subject to difficulties. As is pointed out by
Professor Willis,30 the apparent advantage of certainty which a literal
approach seems to yield is really illusory. Even if the members of
a court do agree that certain words have a plain meaning, it is by no
means certain that they will arrive at the same conclusion as to what
that meaning is. The notorious case of Ellerman Lines v. Murray31
is illustrative. There all the judges were satisfied that the meaning
was plain but managed to produce three different versions of what
that meaning was. The problem is also aptly demonstrated in the
present case wherein both Courts went to some pains to insist that
they were enforcing the plain meaning of the words.
Maxwell, commenting on the presumption against invasion of
common law rights, has said:
In construing the words of an Act of Parliament we are justified in
assuming the legislature did not intend to go against the ordinary rules
of law, unless the language they have used obliges the court to come to
the conclusion that they did so intend.3 2
Such a view might be attacked as unduly conservative for this age.
Willis regarded it as something of a relic lingering on only in text
books.33 But the present decision is evidence of its continuing vitality
and it is submitted that its role ought to be one of increasing impor-
tance in this era of constantly encroaching legislation.
An analysis of these and other modes of statutory interpretation
seems always to lead to the same conclusion. Regardless of their
relative merits and defects, the courts remain unwilling to divest
themselves of any of these tools entirely. They prefer to retain
them all against an occasion when each may be of value in achieving
what the judges consider to be a desired end. It is submitted that
such a multiplicity of tools and the degree of uncertainty associated
with them is preferable to stultifying rigidity. If the conclusions
which the courts reach are unsatisfactory to those concerned, they
can, if necessary, be altered by legislation.
29 Mail and Empire, April 7, 1896.3 o Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell (1938) 16 Can. Bar Rev. 1, 7.
31 [1931] A.C. 126.32 Maxvell on Interpretation of Statutes 11th ed., p. 79.
33 Supra, footnote 30, 14.
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The impact of the present decision on the construction industry
remains to be considered. The Supreme Court has preferred a res-
trictive view of the Mechanics' Lien Act or, at least, has opposed its
extension. It may well be argued that, to the extent which the Act
protects substantial contractors and suppliers such as the present
respondents, it merely does for them what they ought to be expected
to do for themselves. It ought to be a primary concern of any business-
man to assure himself of the strength of the credit of any party
with whom he proposes to contract. It is submitted that there seems
to be little justification for giving the members of a particular trade
special protection in case their initial precautions prove inadequate.
Therefore, to the extent that the decision of the Supreme Court
arrested the further expansion of such special protection, it is to be
applauded.
An interview with the manager of a firm in the equipment
rental business amply justifies this conclusion. When told of the
Court's decision, he commented that the result had not altered his
view of his legal rights in any way. He never had considered a mechan-
ics' lien to be a protection of which he could avail himself. Knowing
that his claim for rent would be unsecured, he habitually took extra
care in the selection of his "accounts" and where a venture appeared
risky he insisted on payment of rent in advance.
It is just such reasonable business attitudes which the Act tends
to make unnecessary for those who are protected by it. Admittedly
labourers are entitled to special protection but there seems to be little
justification for the continued pampering of large companies which
ought to be perfectly capable of looking after themselves.
It is for the legislature to decide whether the conclusion of the
Supreme Court is to be overcome by new legislation. Doubtless it will
be ably assisted in its deliberations by the members of the trades
affected. It is submitted that the result of the Supreme Court decision
ought not to be changed. If anything, to the extent that the Mechanics'
Lien Act operates as an insurance policy against the consequences of
sloppy credit practices, consideration ought to be given to amending
it. The benefits would probably outweigh the disadvantages if sub-
stantial contractors and suppliers were deprived of the special protec-
tion which they now enjoy. B.B.C.T.
(iii) MINE LEASES
Imperial Oil Limited v. Placid Oil Company, reported in [1963] S.C.R.
333.
This case is concerned basically with the effect of section 3 of
the Road Allowances Crown Oil Act, 1959 (Sask.) upon the owner-
ship of oil within an oilfield, and with the nature of the interest
created by The Mineral Resources Act 1931 (Sask.) c. 16, which
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